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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KERRY ROSS BOREN,

:
Case No. 900161

Petitioner/Appellant

:

v.

:

GARY W. DELAND, Director, Utah
State Dept. of Corrections;

:

Priority No. 2

Respondent/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a denial of Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus involving a conviction of second degree murder, a
first degree felony.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-2 (3)(i) (Supp. 1990).
STATgflENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Whether the lower court correctly ruled as a matter

of law that petitioner's opportunity to rebut the presentence
report was waived by counsel?

A trial court's statement of law

or legal conclusion is afforded no deference and is reviewed for
correctness.

City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513,

516 (Utah 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (4) (Interim Supp. 1984):
(4) Prior to imposition of any sentence for
an offense for which probation may be
granted, the court may, with the concurrence
of the defendant, continue the date for the

imposition of sentence for a reasonable
period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence report on the defendant• The
report shall be prepared by the Department of
Adult Probation and Parole. The report shall
include a specific statement of pecuniary
damages, accompanied by a recommendation from
adult probation and parole regarding the
payment of restitution by the defendant. The
contents of the report shall be confidential.
The court may disclose all or parts of the
report to the defendant or his counsel as the
interest of justice requires. At the time of
sentence, the court shall hear any testimony
or information the defendant or the
prosecuting attorney may wish to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. This
testimony or information shall be presented
in open court on record and in the presence
of the defendant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff pled guilty to second degree murder, a first
degree felony, on April 16, 1984, in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding (R. 32-38).

Plaintiff was

sentenced on May 17, 1984, to serve an indeterminate term of 5
years to life in the Utah State Prison (R. 40-43).
On August 20, 1987, defendant filed a Motion to
Withdraw Plea of Guilty and a brief memorandum in support of his
motion (R. 45-48).

In his motion, plaintiff asserted that his

defense counsel failed to disclose to him the contents and
information contained in the presentence report (Id..). After an
evidentiary hearing held October 28, 1987, Judge Frank G. Noel,
Third District Court Judge, denied plaintiff's motion concluding
that plaintiff freely, voluntarily and knowingly entered his plea
of guilty to second degree murder (R. 50-54).

-2-

On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's denial of plaintiff's motion to withdraw his guilty plea
in an unpublished opinion filed October 11, 1989.

State v.

Boren, No. 890328-CA (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1989) (unpublished
opinion) (see Addendum "A"; Opinion).

This Court denied

plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari on January 22, 1990.
In a separate action, plaintiff filed a Petition for
Postconviction Relief in the Third Judicial District Court on
March 16, 1988, claiming that his guilty plea was affected by
defense counsel's non-disclosure of the contents of the
presentence report (R. 72-75).

The petition was dismissed by

Judge Frank G. Noel on June 6, 1988, as an attempt to circumvent
the regular appellate process (R. 76-80).

Plaintiff did not

appeal the dismissal of the petition.
On September 26, 1989, plaintiff filed the Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus which is the subject of this appeal (R. 216).

At a hearing on the petition held on January 12, 1990,

Third District Court Judge Scott Daniels summarily dismissed as
frivolous plaintiff's claims regarding alleged pre-guilty plea
1
2
Miranda

and search and seizure violations (R. 127-28).

After

supplemental briefing and taking the matter under advisement,
Judge Daniels entered an order on March, 27, 1990, denying
plaintiff's final claim that a constitutional error occurred when

x

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2
A transcript of the January 12, 1990 hearing has not been
provided on appeal.

his attorney waived an opportunity to rebut the presentence
report (R. 136-38).

(See Addendum "B"; Order).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On September 15, 1983, plaintiff called a 911 telephone
operator to report that his wife, Eliva Boren, was having
3
difficulty breathing (R. 62). Robert Staley, a Salt Lake City
detective, responded to the call and upon arriving at plaintiff's
residence discovered Eliva in a crouched position in the bedroom
(Id.).

Multiple bruises covered her entire body and she appeared

to be dead (Id.).
Medical examination of Eliva confirmed her death and
revealed that the cause of death was "blunt force trauma" and
could not have been self-inflicted (Ld.).

Medical examination

also concluded that the cause of death, a probable beating,
occurred on or before September 10, 1983 and September 13, 1983,
at least two to five days prior to plaintiff's 911 call (Id.).
Holly Bollschweile, age 26, and Karen Boren, age 9,
were residing at plaintiff's home at the time of the victim's
death (Id.).

Both of them stated that on or about September 13,

1983, plaintiff entered the victim's bedroom and locked the
bedroom door (Ici.).
victim (jld.).

They heard sounds of plaintiff beating the

They also said they had heard plaintiff beating

the victim on prior occasions (Id.).
On September 19, 1983, plaintiff was arrested and
charged with second degree murder, a first degree felony, in

The facts of the crime are taken from the Brief of Respondent
in State v. Boren, No. 890328-CA.

violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a) and (b)(Supp. 1983)
(Id.)-

On April 16# 1984, plaintiff entered a plea of "guilty"

to an amended information charging second degree murder under
subsection (c), the depraved indifference subsection (R. 63).
Judge Jay E. Banks sentenced defendant to a term of five years to
life in the Utah State Prison (R. 40-43).

Plaintiff did not

appeal his conviction and sentence.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court properly denied defendant's
postconviction claim that constitutional error occurred when his
presentence report was unconditionally provided to his counsel,
but not directly to him, prior to sentencing.

Because counsel

was provided a copy of the presentence report and permitted to
discuss the contents with defendant, the sentencing court did not
err.

Defendant does not claim counsel was ineffective for not

discussing the presentence report with him, but instead argues
that the sentencing court was required to provide a copy of the
report directly to defendant.

However, no such requirement

exists, nor would it be judicially provident.
The lower Court properly dismissed as frivolous and
successive defendant's claim of a pre-guilty plea Miranda
violation.

In any event, defendant waived any Miranda violation

claim by pleading guilty.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT NO
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION OCCURRED WHEN
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY WAIVED AN OPPORTUNITY TO
REBUT THE PRESENTENCE REPORT.
On appeal, as in the lower court, plaintiff claims that
his sentence was constitutionally defective because a copy of his
presentence report was disclosed to his counsel but not to him
prior to sentencing.

(See Brief of Appellant at 6). Notably, he

does not claim that his counsel was precluded from disclosing the
contents of the report, but rather that his counsel simply did
not show him the report.

Neither does plaintiff claim that his

counsel acted incompetently.

In sum, plaintiff claims that he

had a fundamental right to his own copy of his presentence report
and that the district court could not rely on defense counsel to
disclose the report to plaintiff.

Plaintiff's claim should be

rejected.
Plaintiff seeks postconviction relief under Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure 65B(i).

To be successful, plaintiff must

establish a substantial denial of his rights under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution.

Utah

R. Civ. P. 65B(i)(l).
At the time of plaintiff's conviction and sentence,
statutory law provided that the "contents of the [presentence]
report shall be confidential.

The court may disclose all or

parts of the report to the defendant or his counsel as the
interest of justice requires."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(4)

(Interim Supp. 1984)(emphasis added).
-G-

This discretionary

language was subsequently deleted from the statute.

See Utah

Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1990).
Previously, this Court had clearly stated that
procedural fairness requires that all parts of a presentence
report be disclosed to a defendant or counsel prior to
sentencing, except when disclosure of information may jeopardize
the life or safety of third persons.

State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d

1005, 1008 (Utah 1982); State v. Lipskyf 608 P.2d 1241, 1248
(Utah 1980).

In Casarez, this Court indicated that because

sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, the
failure to allow a defendant's counsel sufficient opportunity to
read and investigate a presentence report may be equivalent to a
denial of access to counsel.

Casarez, 656 P.2d at 1007-08.

In the present case, the presentence report was
disclosed to plaintiff's counsel prior to sentencing in
accordance with Casarez.

It is undisputed that plaintiff's

counsel had an opportunity to read and investigate the
presentence report.

It is also undisputed that counsel had an

opportunity to refute the information in the presentence report.
Apparently, he chose not to do so.
The remaining question is whether the opportunity to
rebut a presentence report may be waived by counsel's silence, or
in other words, must be personally waived by a defendant.

As

petitioner's representative before the sentencing court, defense
counsel had the opportunity to review the presentence report for
accuracy and raise challenges if necessary.

It is axiomatic that

a represented party is generally deemed to be informed of a

matter when the trial court unconditionally informs the party's
counsel.

The criminal justice system depends upon the principle

that a defense attorney is a defendant's agent before the court.
In fact, relatively few constitutional rights cannot be waived by
counsel.

See State v. Butterfield, 784 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah 1989)

(e.g., right to trial, right to be present at trial, right to
trial by jury, and the right to an interpreter at trial).

In

Butterfield, this Court held that the failure of defendant or his
counsel to object to the exclusion of the public from the
courtroom constituted a waiver of defendant's right to a public
trial.
Analogous to Butterfield, defendant's counsel in the
present case was provided a copy of the presentence report.
While defendant alleges that his counsel did not review the
report with him, there is no allegation that counsel was
precluded from doing so.

Counsel's silence regarding the

accuracy of the report constituted a waiver of an objection to
the report.

It is generally accepted that "[djecisions as to ...

what objections to make ... are generally left to the
professional judgment of counsel."
1021, 1023 (Utah 1989).

State v. Medina, 738 P.2d

Notably, plaintiff did not argue in the

lower court, nor does he argue on appeal, that counsel's failure
to rebut the presentence report constituted ineffective
assistance.
In sum, procedural fairness requires that a presentence
report be disclosed to the defendant or his counsel.

If it is

disclosed to counsel and no objections are raised, the trial

court is not obligated to inquire whether counsel has disclosed
or discussed the report with the defendant.

The trial court may

rely upon the attorney/client relationship to effectively inform
the defendant of the contents of the report.

To rule otherwise

would unnecessarily intrude upon the attorney/client relationship
and require a defendant's personal waiver in mere procedural
matters.
POINT II
BY PLEADING GUILTY, PLAINTIFF WAIVED ALL NONJURISDICTIONAL, PRE-PLEA CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATIONS.
Plaintiff also claims that information contained in his
presentence report was illegally seized in violation of his
Miranda rights.

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

As

a result, he complains that the Board of Pardons has relied on
this illegally seized information in determining his length and
conditions of confinement.
The lower court granted the State's motion to dismiss
plaintiff's Miranda claim on the basis that it constituted a
frivolous claim in a successive postconviction petition (R. 12728).

Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(g); Andrews v. Shulsen, 773 P.2d 832

(Utah 1988).

Because petitioner does not allege "good cause" for

filing a successive petition, this Court need not consider
plaintiff's claim.
In any event, it is well-settled that by pleading
guilty, a defendant waives all nonjurisdictional defects,
4
While plaintiff does not specify the nature of this supposed
illegally seized information, it appears to be plaintiff's own
confession. (See Brief of Appellant at 11).

including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations.

Tollett v.

Henderson 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d
1275, 1278 (Utah 1989);
(2d ed. 1987).

4 LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.1 (d)

In the instant case, plaintiff's guilty plea was

upheld as voluntary by the Utah Court of Appeals.

State v.

Boren, No. 890328-CA (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1989) (unpublished
opinion) (see Appendix "A"; opinion).

By pleading guilty,

plaintiff waived any claim that information was illegally
obtained by a Miranda violation.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully asks
this Court to affirm the lower court's denial of plaintiff's
petition.

DATED this

day of October, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

<L

<

^

DAN R. 1ARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Response was mailed, postage pre-paid, to Kerry Rcjss
Boren, pro se, P.O. Box 250, Draper, UT
October, 1990.
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

OPINION
(Not For Publication)

v.
Kerry Ross Boren,

Case No. 890328-CA

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Frank G. Noel
Attorneys:

Connie L. Mower, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Dan R. Larsen, Salt Lake City,
for Respondent

Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Bullock.1
BULLOCK, Judge:
Kerry Ross Boren appeals the denial of his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.
Boren was charged in 1983 with the second-degree murder of
his wife. The information charging him was amended to include
not only a charge for intentional second-degree murder under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a) and (b) (Supp. 1983), but also for
second degree murder "acting under circumstances evidencing a
depraved indifference to human life" as provided in Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c) (Supp. 1983). At his arraignment, Boren
waived a formal reading of the amended information and pleaded
not guilty.
Some time after Boren*s arraignment, his counsel discovered
that the original information against him had been amended to
include a charge under the "depraved indifference" subsection of
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by special
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(1)(j) (1987).

the statute defining second-degree murder. Boren and his counsel
discussed the possibility of a plea bargain, and Boren reportedly
refused to plead guilty to knowing or intentional murder.
Borenfs counsel# however, called his attention to the possibility
of pleading guilty to charges under the "depraved indifferencesubsection of the statute.
On April 16, 1984, Boren appeared with his counsel before the
district court, Judge Jay E. Banks presiding, and changed to
guilty his plea to the charge of second-degree murder. In the
ensuing colloquy, the principal focus was on the "depraved
indifference" subsection:
The Court: Your name is Kerry R. Boren, and
I believe you are charged with murder in the
second degree.
Ms. Carter [Borenfs counsel]: Your honor,
perhaps I could help the court. He is
pleading under the depraved indifference
section and not under either the "a" or "b"
subsections.
The Court:

Is that agreeable with the state?

Mr. Gunnarson [for the State]:
honor.

Yes, your

The Court: By entering a plea of guilty,
you do, in fact, admit the facts that
support that charge. Do you understand
that? That means the depraved indifference
to human life.
Mr. Boren:

Yes, your honor.

Boren then indicated, among other things, that he was
literate in the English language, was without mental impairment,
and that he understood his constitutional rights and the fact
that he was waiving them by pleading guilty. The court pointed
out potential sentences that could be imposed for the crime to
which Boren was pleading, and then continued:

2

The Court: Mr. Boren, to the charge of
criminal homicide, murder in the second
degree, a first-degree felony, as I have
explained it to you, which occurred at 34
East Miller Avenue in Salt Lake County,
state of Utah, on or about September 15,
1983, in violation of title 76, chapter 6,
section 203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, in that you, Kerry R. Boren . . .
caused the death of Elvia Boren—while
acting under circumstances evidencing a
depraved indifference to human life—engaged
in conduct which created a grave risk of
death to another and thereby caused the
death of Elvia Boren. What now is your
plea, guilty or not guilty?
Mr. Boren:

Guilty, your honor.

The Court: Plea of guilty is received, and
the court finds that it was freely and
voluntarily made by the defendant, that he
is not presently under the influence of any
drugs, narcotics, or alcoholic beverages,
nor has a physical or mental disability as
such that interferes with his free choice to
enter such a plea. I base those findings on
my observations of the defendant here in the
courtroom, together with the questions that
were put to him and his responses thereto.
At the hearing, Boren also signed an affidavit acknowledging
his plea of guilty. The affidavit recited the elements of the
offense as "acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved
indifference to human life, Defendant engaged in conduct which
created a grave risk of death to another and thereby caused the
death of another." The affidavit stated the facts as "I created
a grave risk of death to my wife which resulted in her death by
my lack of appropriate treatment and care.91
In July of 1987, Boren moved to withdraw his plea of guilty.
After an evidentiary hearing and review of the transcript of the
hearing at which the plea was entered, the district court denied

3

the motion. Boren appeals, arguing that his guilty plea was not
knowing, intelligent,
or voluntary, or in conformity with Utah R.
Crim. P. 11(e).2
The entry of the guilty plea in this case occurred before the
decision in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), which we
do not apply retroactively. State v. Hickman. 115 Utah Adv. Rep.
14 (Utah 1989); State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App.
1988). We therefore review Boren*s motion to withdraw his plea
to determine whether, based on the record as a whole, the plea
was entered with full knowledge and understanding of its
consequences and of the rights that Boren thereby waived. Brooks
v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985); Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d
309 (Utah 1985); see also Jolivet v. Cook, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 17,
18 (Utah 1989).
Boren argues that it was not clear from the original
proceedings that his plea of guilty was based exclusively on the
depraved indifference portion of the second-degree murder
statute, subsection 76-5-203(1)(c), and that his guilty plea was
not based on a sufficient understanding of the elements of the
crime as explained in State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1044-49
(Utah 1984) and its progeny. As indicated above, however, the
principal focus of the hearing at which Boren*s guilty plea was
accepted was the depraved indifference subsection, and Boren*s
affidavit clearly states the elements of depraved indifference
murder. Based on our review of the record as a whole, we cannot
conclude that Boren lacked adequate understanding of
second-degree murder with depraved indifference, or that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying Boren*s motion to
withdraw his plea.

2. In a supplementary brief filed with this court, Boren also
questions other procedures employed in the original proceedings
against him. However, these arguments are not timely raised
before this court, and do not appear to have been considered by
the trial court. We therefore do not address them. Jolivet v.
Cook, 115 Utah Adv. Rep 17, 19 (Utah 1989).

4

The denial of Borenfs motion to withdraw his plea of guilty
is therefore affirmed.

i . Robert Bullock, Judge

WE CONCUR:

/£L^£^ig

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
DAN R. LARSEN (4865)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KERRY ROSS BOREN,
Petitioner,
v.

:

ORDER

:
Case No.

GARY W. DELAND, Utah State
:
Prison, Department of Corrections,

890905823

Judge Scott Daniels

Respondent.
The above-entitled matter came on for oral argument on
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on January 12, 1990, at
the hour of 11:00 a.m., before the Honorable Scott Daniels, Third
District Court Judge.
himself.

Petitioner was present representing

Respondent was represented by Dan R. Larsen, Assistant

Attorney General.

After hearing the arguments of the parties,

reviewing the supplemental memorandums of law, and taking the
matter under advisement, the Court filed a signed Minute Entry on
March 9, 1990 ruling on the sole remaining issue as follows:
Petitioner seeks post-conviction relief under Utah R.
Civ. P. 65B(i) on the basis that his sentence was constitu-

r\r\"

or*

tionally defective where a copy of his presentence report was
disclosed to his counsel but not to him prior to sentencing.

A

criminal defendant is entitled to review his presentence report
and to rebut or correct matters in the report.
656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 1982).

State v. Casarez,

However, this right is not a

fundamental right and may be waived counsel.

See e.g., State v.

Butterfield, 123 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah Dec. 27, 1989).

It is

undisputed that petitioner's counsel was provided a copy of the
presentence report and given an opportunity to challenge the
accuracy of the report. Accordingly, petitioner's right to
personally review and rebut the presentence report was waived by
counsel.
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied.
DATED this

<y7 day of March, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

-2r\r\

* *">•**

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to Kerry Ross Boren,
pro se, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah

84020, t h i s < 2 _ day of
/)

March, 1990.
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